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Schara: Knowledge is Salvation: Informing Investors By Regulating Disclos

NOTE

KNOWLEDGE IS SALVATION: INFORMING
INVESTORS BY REGULATING DISCLOSURES TO
SAFEGUARD BEST EXECUTION
I.

INTRODUCTION

Command and control of information-knowledge-sustain the
powerful over the ill informed.' In the securities industry, informational
disparities and advantages translate into massive gains and catastrophic
losses. 2 Today, the world of high-frequency trading has emerged from

the shadows and sparked a technological battle between those who are
informed and those who are not. Regulators, industry leaders, and
scholars have continuously addressed questions hovering around highfrequency trading since the release of Michael Lewis's book, Flash
Boys.4 Firms engaging in high-frequency trading use advanced
technologies, such as fiber optics, co-location, and advanced algorithms,
to implement their trading strategies.5 Technology allows highfrequency traders to receive and transmit data at an extremely high
rate. 6 By doing so, they swiftly execute trades based on information
1. See Joris Luyendijk, QuantitativeProp Trader: I Wouldn't Try to Raise the Priceof Rice
and Starve China, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 12, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/

joris-luyendijk-banking-blog/2012/apr/02/quantatitive-prop-trader-voices-of-finance?newsfeed=true
(explaining the process by which a proprietary trader uses market information to create a trading
strategy).

2.

See id. (calling proprietary trading a "meritocratic" type of trading that can make such

traders enormous amounts of money).
3. See infra Part II.C.
4. MICHAEL LEwis, FLASH Boys: A WALL STREET REVOLT (2013); see Rob Tricchinelli,
'Markets Are Not Rigged,' SEC Chair Says of High Speed Trading, BLOOMBERG BNA (Apr. 29,

2014), http://news.bna.com/srln/SRLNWB/split -display.adp?fedfid=45840823&vname=srlmotalIl
issues&jd=srlr 46 861&split=-0 (noting that "[s]ince the publication of [Flash Boys], the FBI, SEC
and New York State Attorney General Eric Schneiderman have all said they are investigating high-

frequency traders").
5. Tara Bhupathi, Technology's Latest Market Manipulator?High Frequency Trading: The
Strategies, Tools, Risks, and Responses, 11 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 377,385-91 (2010).

6. Id. at 385-86 (citing the improvements in communication and the ability to trade at an
ever-increasing rate).
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that they see milliseconds
before other market players-because of
7
their technology.
Recent investigations into high-frequency trading reveal that the
strategies implemented, and not the technology used to implement those
strategies, should be the focus of any legal debate surrounding highfrequency trading. 8 Importantly, the technology used by high-frequency
traders is not illegal. 9 But, the way the technology works may afford
traders an opportunity to engage in a strategy that violates best
execution, or slips into the realm of market manipulation.10
The use of fees and rebates on various exchanges1 1 incentivizes
traders, specifically high-frequency traders, to trade within any given
exchange.12 Most of these exchanges pay traders for being "marketmakers." 3 Exchanges happily pay these small rebates to high-frequency
7. Michael J. McGowan, The Rise of Computerized High Frequency Trading: Use and
Controversy, DUKE L. & TECH. REv., Nov. 2010, at 2 (explaining the ability of high-frequency
trading firms to see information, even "miniscule economic fluctuations," and acting on that
information for profit).
8. See Bhupathi, supra note 5, at 382-85 (describing questionable strategies arising from
high-frequency trading, and explaining that the technology itself is not at the heart of highfrequency trading issues).
9. See Tricchinelli, supra note 4 (stating that without the front-running of trades, the use of
exchange data through high-frequency trading technology is simply not illegal).
10. See Christie Smythe, PR Newswire Reaches Deal With Scheiderman in HFT Probe,
BLOOMBERG BNA (Apr. 30, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-04-30/prnewswire-reaches-deal-with-scheiderman-in-hft-probe (asserting that high-frequency trading is the
"new generation of market manipulators" (quoting Attorney General Eric Schneiderman)). "Best
execution" refers to the affirmative duty of industry professionals to execute trades on behalf of
their clients that are consistent with the priorities of the client. FINRA R. 5310(a)(1) (2014). For
example, some clients may want their broker to execute trades at the best possible price, while
others may want their trades executed in the fastest way possible. "Market manipulation" involves
fraudulent acts aimed at affecting the price of a particular stock. 15 U.S.C. § 78i (2012).
11. An "exchange" means any organization "which constitutes, maintains, or provides a
market place or facilities for bringing together purchasers and sellers of securities." 15 U.S.C. §
78c(a)(1) (2012). For a discussion of how the courts and the SEC have approached issues of
whether an entity is an exchange or not, see J. Scott Colesanti, Trotting Out the White Horse: How
the S.E.C. Can Handle Bitcoin's Threat to American Investors, 65 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 18-22
(2014).
12. Dave Michaels, NYSE Joins Funds Seeking to End Maker-Taker Trading Rebates,
BLOOMBERG BNA (Feb. 25, 2014), http://www.bna.com/nyse-joins-funds-seeking-to-end-makertaker-trading-rebates.
13. Id. "Market-makers" provide liquidity to markets by providing for both the buy-side and
sell-side of a security. Market Model Overview: DMM Case Studies, N.Y. STOCK ExCHANGE,
https://www.nyse.com/market-model/dmm-case-studies (last visited Sept. 2, 2015). When no other
buyer or seller exists to match an order placed by an investor, market-makers have a duty to
purchase or sell their own personal shares of stock in order to keep the market for any given stock
liquid. Id. For example, if a buyer places an order for 100 shares of Nordstrom stock (Symbol:
JWN) at $75.00, and there is no seller for her order, the designated market-maker for JWN will
execute the trade from her personal holdings of JWN. See id
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traders for being market-makers because high-frequency traders provide
liquidity to the market.14 High-frequency traders and exchanges enjoy a
symbiotic relationship where traders bring business to exchanges, and
exchanges offer fee and rebate incentives, as well as the opportunity for
co-location.' 5 This relationship is at the core of the legal issues
surrounding high-frequency trading, especially regarding exchanges
offering high-frequency traders direct access to information, and
thus, affording
them an opportunity that other market participants do
16
possess.
not
Additionally, the use of dark pools 17 in conjunction with highfrequency trading has become an issue.' 8 Darks pools are the antithesis
of transparency. 19 Traders send orders to the dark pools, which will
execute the trades within the participants of the dark pool. 20 Dark pools

are commonly used as a place for traders to buy or sell large blocks of
stock.2 ' On the open market, such trades may greatly affect the price of
that stock.22 Dark pools help to stifle the volatility of the markets.2 3
Rules that regulate best execution and disclosure will impose
obligations to the market on high-frequency trading in exchange for

14. EUREx, HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADING IN VOLATILE MARKETS - AN EXAMINATION 2
(Nov. 2011), http://www.eurexchange.com/blob/exchangeen/455384/199288/2/data/factsheet-high
frequencytrad-ing in volatile markets.pdf (describing the process by which high-frequency
trading "protects the market by placing a rapid succession of small, non-directional buy and sell
orders" that decrease volatility).
15. Id. Co-location involves placing computers close to one another to reduce the amount of
time needed to send messages via fiber-optic cables. LEWIS, supra note 1, at 63-64.
16. Smythe, supra note 10 (citing various news sources' refusal to provide direct access to
high-frequency trading, or their refusal to continue to provide such access).
17. Dark pools are "segregated," non-public venues that offer buyers and sellers anonymity
"to avoid front running by high-frequency traders." Edwin Batista, A Shot in the Dark.-An Analysis
of the SEC's Response to The Rise of DarkPools, 14 J. HIGH TECH. L. 83, 84 (2014).
18. Jared Bernstein, The Importance of Shedding Some Light on Dark Pools, UPSHOT: N.Y.
TIMES (July 22, 2014), http://www.nytimes.coin/2014/07/23/upshot/the-importance-of-sheddingsome-light-on-dark-pools.html?_r-0&abt=-0002&abg= 1.
19. Peter J. Henning, Secrecy of Dark Pools Can Blur Both Ways, N.Y. TIMES (June 30,2014,
10:19
AM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/06/30/secrecy-of-dark-pools-can-blur-bothways/? r-0 (noting that "[dark pools] give large investors, like mutual funds and pension plans, a
place to trade large blocks of stock without revealing their strategies to others who could take
advantage").
20. Id. (stating that dark pools account for thirty-five percent of the equity traded in the
United States).
21. Id.
22. Vassils Vergotis et al., Eurex Exchange Releases Results of Proprietary HFT
Research, AUTOMATED TRADER MAG. (2013), http://www.eurexchange.com/blob/526632/
723a0bbd21280466aa556392f4fd0d86/data/Automated-TraderHFT.pdf.
23. Id. (explaining the process by which high-frequency trading participants provide liquidity
and decrease volatility).
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offering high-frequency trading a permanent and prominent role in
today's markets. Part II of this Note presents the historical background
of the impact of Regulation Alternative Trading Systems ("ATS") 24 and
the emergence of Regulation National Market System ("NMS").25
Additionally, Part II discusses the development of a centralized market,
the changing of the guard from "specialists" to designated market
makers ("DMM"), and the exponential growth of high-frequency
trading. 26 Part III investigates several legal issues that emerge as highfrequency trading secures dominance in the market: whether highfrequency traders function according to Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority ("FINRA") Rule 5310 best execution; 27 whether Securities
Exchange Commission ("SEC" or "Commission") Rule 60528 and Rule
60629 provide adequate disclosures to investors; 30 and whether the
fragmentation of the market from one monopoly to many privately
operated exchanges will benefit investors. 3' Part IV offers changes to the
statutory landscape to protect market participants, decrease volatility,
and properly monitor the actions of high-frequency traders to safeguard
market integrity, efficiency, and transparency.3 2
II.

REGULATING FOR AN EFFICIENT MARKET AND THE RISE OF
HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADING

High-frequency trading emerged over the past two decades as the
most efficient and quickest method of executing trades.3 3 The practice
developed due to two key SEC regulations: (1) Regulation ATS; and (2)
Regulation NMS.34 As technology changed, and trading became
automated, a shift also occurred in the duties and obligations of the
people that worked at stock exchanges.35 The New York Stock Exchange
("NYSE") fervently promotes its desire to retain a human element on its
trading floor, reclassifying the "specialist" as a DMM.36 When the

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

17 C.F.R. § 242.300(a) (2014).
17 C.F.R. § 242.600(b) (2014).
See infra Part H.A-C.
FINRAR. 5310; see infra Part HI.A.
17 C.F.R. § 242.605 (2014).
17 C.F.R. § 242.606 (2014).
See infra Part 1II.B.
See infra Part III.A-B.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part f.C.
See infra Part ll.A.
Market Model Overview: DMM Case Studies, supra note 10.
Id.
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exchanges computerized, many employees became obsolete, replaced by
the machines produced through the infrastructure of Regulation ATS
and Regulation NMS. 37 This transformation poses many issues, such
as, whether high-frequency traders assume the same obligations to
the market as3 8 DMMs, even when they are not trading on behalf
of a customer.
If regulators charge high-frequency traders with assuming such
duties and obligations, then many of Michael Lewis's fears that highfrequency traders negatively impact market integrity will be quelled.39
The speed with which trades are executed today bestows several
crucial benefits to the integrity of the market, and a simple regulatory
structure aimed at increasing transparency can properly police the
activities of high-frequency traders.40 Imposing regulation to increase
transparency and to expressly affirm the duties and obligations of highfrequency traders to the market in general will adequately address
Lewis's warnings.41
A.

The FirstIncisions: How the Securities Exchange Commission
Fragmentedthe Market to Defeat the New York
Stock Exchange and Increase Competition

In 1998, the SEC promulgated Regulation ATS to increase
competition, dismantling the NYSE's monopoly over the market and
leading to market fragmentation.42 Regulation ATS sought to define and
regulate alternative trading systems in a way that would afford them the
ability to grow.43 Regulation ATS an defines alternative trading system
37. See infra Part H.A, II.C.
38. See Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Proposes Rule to Require
Broker-Dealers Active in Off-Exchange Market to Become Member of National Securities
Association (Mar, 25, 2015) http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-48.html (proposing
amendments to regulatory oversight to increase the responsibility of high-frequency traders to the
market).
39. See infra Part IV.A-B.
40. See Douglas Cumming, Don't Lose Sight of The Benefits Of High-Frequency
Trading by Focusing on the Abuses, FIN. POST (Apr. 2, 2014, 5:28 PM),
http://business.fmancialpost.com/2014/04/02/high-frequency-trading-michael-lewis
(listing the
benefits of high-frequency trading: decreased trading costs, fewer instances of market manipulation,
increased trading volume, and increased market liquidity).
41. See infra Part IV.A-B.
42. Charlie Herman, Future of the New York Stock Exchange May Hinge on Its Past, WNYC
NEWS (Dec. 21, 2012), http://www.wnyc.org/story/258866-blog-future-new-york-stock-exchange.
43. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-16 (2014). Rule 3b-16 states: "Generally, an entity will be considered
an exchange if it brings together buyers and sellers and establishes fixed rules for executing their
orders. An entity will generally not be considered an exchange if it routes orders to a market for
execution or operates a 'crossing' or 'matching' system." Mark Borrelli, Market Making in The
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as any system that provides a venue for buyers and sellers of securities
to trade that functions like a stock exchange. 44 Additionally, these
systems must not "[s]et rules governing the conduct of subscribers," or
45
"[d]iscipline subscribers other than by exclusion from trading.
Regulation ATS required alternative trading systems, among other
things, to register as a broker-dealer, display orders to all market
participants, maintain a minimum trading volume, and charge access46
fees "[consistent] with [the] standard of equivalent access.
Additionally, any trading system which "exceeds certain volume levels
and the Commission determines ... that an exemption is not
appropriate," will be considered an exchange and not an alternative
trading system.47
The SEC implemented Regulation ATS to "allow developing
systems with low volume to operate with minimal regulatory burdens. 48
Simultaneously, more extensive regulatory burdens weighed down larger
volume systems, requiring "more extensive regulation of their quotation
dissemination and access standard. ' 49 By promulgating Regulation ATS,
the Commission opened up avenues for new trading systems to enter the
market, tailoring its regulations to allow for increased competition. 50 The
SEC endeavored to ease the burden of regulation on alternative trading
systems, but even with minimal oversight, the SEC safeguarded
investors by establishing specific protective requirements.5
In 1975, Congress charged the Commission with implementing a
national market system to facilitate trading between various entities

Electronic Age, 32 LOY. U. C1I. L.J. 815, 852-53 (2001).
44. 17 C.F.R. § 242.300(a) (2014).
45. § 242.300(a)(2).
46. See generally 17 C.F.R. § 242.301(b)(4) (2014). Section 242.301(b)(4) created a "major
issue surrounding alternative trading systems." See Borrelli, supra note 38, at 856. The systems

"generate revenue by charging access fees," and are not expressly quantified by the SEC. Id
47. Borrelli, supra note 43, at 854. Regulation ATS's provisions for best execution and
displaying quotes were only applicable subject to a volume level of a "particular security." Id. at
855. This means that a system may be subject to Regulation ATS (and not Regulation NMS) for one
stock traded on its system, but not for other stocks traded above a certain volume level, subjecting
those higher volume stocks to Regulation NMS. Id.
48. Id. at 854.
49. Id.
50. Robert L.D. Colby & Erik R. Sirri, Consolidation and Competition in the US Equity
Markets, 5 CAP. MARKETS. L.J. 169, 173 (2010).
51. § 242.301(b)(6). Alternative trading systems must establish capacity estimates of their
system, conduct capacity stress tests, review their systems integrity, maintain contingency
procedures, audit their systems annually, and disclose to the SEC any material issues with their
systems. § 242.301(b)(6)(ii)(A)-(G).
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across the country.52 Thirty years later, the time finally came that the
Commission could impose Regulation NMS, which created a regulatory
environment that could "appropriately respond to fundamental economic
and competitive forces" and reigned in the market fragmentation
initiated by Regulation ATS.53 In doing so, the Commission began
stripping the NYSE of its monopolistic hold over the market.5 4 Since its
inception in the early nineteenth century, until the implementation of
Regulation NMS in 2007, the NYSE dominated the market by providing
the avenue for nearly all trading.55 With the new regulation and the
fragmentation of the market in the late twenty-first century, Regulation
NMS enabled competition by affording new entities the ability to enter
into this NYSE-dominated market.5 6 The Commission sought to achieve
consensus between the dominant NYSE and new market participants,
but understood that achieving a consensus "should not damage the
competitiveness of the U.S. equity markets. ' '57 Accordingly, the
regulation created four substantive rules to "modernize and strengthen"
the regulatory structure of the U.S. equity markets,58 seeking to construct
a national system that could efficiently provide a central market for all
U.S. equity trading.59
Regulation NMS instituted four rules that founded market
centralization. 60 First, it established the "Order Protection Rule"
requiring all venues to "establish, maintain, and enforce written policies
and procedures reasonably designed to prevent the execution of trades at
prices inferior" to prices displayed by other trading venues. 61 Second,
the SEC required "fair and non-discriminatory access to quotations" at
all trading venues, including a "limit on access fees to harmonize the
52.

15 U.S.C. § 78k-l(a)(2) (2012); Dale A. Oesterle, Regulation NMS: Has the SEC

Exceeded its Congressional Mandate to Facilitate a "'NationalMarket System"

in Securities

Trading?, 1N.Y.U. J.L. & BuS. 613, 622 (2005).
53. Regulation NMS, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-51808, 70 Fed. Reg. 37496
(June 29, 2005) [hereinafter Release No. 34-51808].
54. Walter Hamilton, Speed-Addicted Traders Dominate Today's Stock Market, L.A. TIMES
(May 16, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/may/16/business/la-fi-new-exchanges-20100516
(discussing how electronic trading networks were able to "chip away" at the dominance of the
NYSE).
55. See id.
56. Id. The NYSE, "[i]n a bow to its faster brethren," revamped the technology used on the
floor of the exchange as well as constructing a high-frequency trading hub of its own. Id.
57. Release No. 34-51808, supra note 53.
58. Id.
59. Oesterle, supranote 46, at 650.
60. See generally Release No. 34-51808, supra note 53 (discussing in detail the four rules
which founded market centralization).
61. Id.at 1.
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This rule also
pricing of quotations across different trading centers.
provided that exchanges adopt, maintain, and enforce rules prohibiting
"lock" or "cross" quotations. 63 Third, the SEC set the "Sub-Penny Rule,"
which prohibited pricing increments smaller than a penny.64 In 2005, the
SEC amended Regulation NMS to include the fourth rule by updating
the requirements for consolidating, distributing, and displaying market
information.65 This amendment consisted of two parts: (1) the
"Allocation Amendment," addressing the dissemination of market
information that modify the formulas for allocating plan revenues;
Amendment," broadening "participation in
and (2) the "Governance
66
plan governance.,
Regulation NMS created market winners and losers.6 7 Standing
atop the winners' podium was the SEC, which created "a permanent
position of enhanced importance for itself."68 The Commission became
the "eight-hundred pound gorilla of our trading market," relegating the
69
NYSE and NASDAQ to positions as its "de facto operating branches.,
On the farthest losing end of the Regulation NMS bargain were the floor
brokers of the NYSE and the American Stock Exchange ("AMEX").7 °
Regulation NMS relegated floor brokers, or "specialists," into nonexistence as the SEC replaced "open out-cry auction exchanges" with an
automated system, favoring technology over man.
62. Id.
63. Id. The SEC banned "locked market[s]" which is a term of art used when two displayed
quotes exist (one on the buy side and one on the sell side) at a particular price and on two separate
exchanges. Id.Complimentary orders such as this "lock" the market when both carry with them
instructions to only be filled within a particular market. Scott Patterson & Jenny Strasburg, How
'Hide Not Slide' Orders Work, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 18, 2012 10:40 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB1000087239639-0444812704577605840263150860. For example,
a buy order with instructions to only fill within Direct Edge (an Electronic Trading Center ("ECN"))
and a sell order on NASDAQ, both of which are to execute at the same price quote create a locked
market. Id. These displayed orders would execute but for the instructions to execute only within
each exchange, respectively. See id.
64. Release No. 34-51808, supra note 53 (reserving an exception for "quotations, or
indications of interest that are priced at less than $1.00 per share").
65. 17 C.F.R. § 242.603 (2014); Release No. 34-51808, supra note 53.
66. Release No. 34-51808, supranote 53.
67. Oesterle supranote 52, at 648.
68. Id.at 648-49.
69. Id. at 649.
70. Onnig H. Dombalagian, Demythologizing the Stock Exchange: Reconciling SelfRegulation and the NationalMarket System, 39 U. RICH. L. REv. 1069, 1075, 1078-79, 1088 (2005)
(describing multiple times that the SEC increased regulation over specialists, including: the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the regulation of self-regulatory organizations ("SRO") in 1962,
and Regulation ATS in 1998).
71. Oesterle supra note 52, at 648 (expressing that "[t]he floor brokers... [were] the big
losers" as a result of automation).
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With the changing players and structure of trading markets, traders
have fabricated new trading methods in order to gain an edge in the
market. 72 It is the high-frequency traders that optimize these methods
and strategies to gain a market advantage.73 However, other types of
trades have also arisen to balance the newly changing market, such as
the "marketable limit order.0 4 While SEC rules require the reporting of
basic information about how brokers handle investor orders, industry
leaders suggest that investors reach out to their brokers to ensure orders
are executed at the best possible prices.7 ' The fact that industry
leaders charge investors to seek specific trade execution and routing
information from their brokers illustrates how the SEC rules fail to
disclose sufficient information to investors.76 Fortunately, simple
changes to disclosure rules can align the desire of investors to
understand how their trades are executed with the informational
advantage that only institutional investors and brokerage firms
maintain.77 A shift in disclosure rules extends the ability to monitor best
execution practices to retail investors.78
Historically, best execution practices and the monitoring of trade
execution rested in the duty-bound hands of floor specialists. 79 However,
72. Stanislav Dolgopolov, High-Frequency Trading, Order Types, and the Evolution of the
Securities Market Structure: One Whistleblower's Consequencesfor Securities Regulation, U. ILL.
J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 145, 148 (2014). Importantly, most new order types are not "sinister," but are
instead indicative of increased competition. Id.
73. Id. at 148-52. Dolgopolov refers to an analogy first made by Haim Bodek in his book, The
Problem of HFT: Collected Writing on High Frequency Trading & Stock Market Structure Reform
(2013), that high-frequency trading order types are like using "chess pieces [against] ignorant
checkers pieces." Dolgopolov, supranote 66, at 147.
74. Jason Zweig, Trading without Tear, WALL ST. J., Feb. 21, 2015, at B1. Marketable limit
orders combine the two classic types of orders-market orders and limit orders. Id. Market orders
execute according to the market best bid and offer; whatever the market says the stock is worth is
what you pay for it. Id. Conversely, limit orders allow an investor to set the highest price at which
she wishes to buy, or the lowest price she wishes to sell. Id. The market limit order fuses the two
together, basically creating a market order with a cap. Thus, an investor can place a buy market
order for a given stock, and also set a limit on that order. Id.
75. Id. "Joe Saluzzi, partner at Themis Trading, [a brokerage firm] ... suggests calling your
broker or financial adviser to ask how your trade was executed and why it was filled at a particular
price." Id.
76. See id.
77. See infra Part IVA-B.
78. Mary Jo White, Chair, Sec. Exch. Comm'n, Speech at the Consumer Federation of
America, 2014 Assembly: Protecting the Retail Investor (Mar. 21, 2014), available at
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370541226174 (stating three ways to protect the
retail investor: education, enforcement and rulemaking).
79. See generally George T. Simon & Kathryn M. Trkla, The Regulation of Specialists and
Implicationsfor the Future, 61 Bus. LAW. 217 (2005) (providing a historical survey of the duties
and regulations of specialists).
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the advent of Regulation ATS and Regulation NMS lifted those duties
from the shoulders of specialists, without imposing them on any specific
market participant. 80
B. Bionic Men: The Specialist Turned DesignatedMarket-Maker
The specialist used to be a human being physically located at a
specific location on the floors of stock exchanges. 8' The specialist
assumed a combined role of broker and dealer, functioning within the
market itself.82 Combining these two market functions-broker and
dealer-the specialist assumed positive and negative obligations to the
markets as they were "principal sources of regulatory concern" due to an
inherent conflict of interest between the specialist's fiduciary obligations
to her customers and her personal trading interests.83
For more than a hundred years. . . a small group of specially qualified
human beings helped control the flow of stock trading. In doing so,
they maintained the ability to protect both consumers and the economy
at large from potentially dangerous swings in market volatility. These
men, who.. maintained a fair and orderly market, were members of a
At the [NYSE],
category of market participant called "market-makers."
' 84
these stewards held the title "specialist."
Specialists, in their role as market-makers, catered to markets by
enhancing liquidity and protecting the industry from market volatility.85
Specialists were obligated to trade stock.86 They "stood ready [and]
' 87
willing" to trade even in the absence of "open market demand."
Exchanges placed enormous responsibility on the shoulders of
specialists, and subsequently subjected them to strict regulations,
promoting an essential element of the specialist's existence80. Id. at 222; see infra Part I.B.
81. Simon & Trkla, supranote 79, at 222.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Jennifer Victoria Christine Dean, Paradigm Shifts & Unintended Consequences: The
Death of the Specialist,the Rise of High Frequency Trading, & the Problem of Duty-Free Liquidity
in Equity Markets, 8 FLA. INT'L U. L. REv. 217,218 (2012).
85. Id. at 224.
86. Id. Specialists were in charge of a group of stocks specific to each specialist. Id. at 220.
On the floor of the NYSE, any given stock trade would have to have been executed through a
specific floor specialist. Id. By having one person execute all trades for a stock, the NYSE insured
that buy and sell orders would be matched appropriately and executed according to the principles of
best execution. Id. Specialists were required to maintain the stocks they specialized in in their own
personal portfolios in an effort to continuously provide liquidity in the stock by always having
someone (the specialist) who is ready and able to execute trades. Id.
87. Id. at 220.
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accountability. 88 In consideration for governing the specialist's behavior,
exchanges (particularly the NYSE) allowed specialists to benefit from
the system.89 Specialists were able to personally profit because they
provided liquidity in markets by buying and selling stock from their own
accounts, thereby enhancing liquidity and enabling investors to trade
90
stock that would otherwise not be bought or sold on the open market.
As auctioneers for a given stock, specialists acted under the
guidance of strict regulatory measures. 9' The obligations of the specialist
monitored them in a way that enabled regulators to "curtail the potential
for speculative or abusive trading and to mitigate the specialist's
information advantages."92 Exchange rules contained the specialist's
potential for abuse by establishing principles of "priority, parity, and
precedence" in the exchange rules, principles which must remain an
essential element of trading today. 93 Specialists were "prohibited from
trading ahead of any order.. . at the same price, and [yielded
to] ... time priority to any.. . orders that [she received] after
establishing [her] own quote. 94 By holding specialists accountable for
breaching their fiduciary duties to the market as a whole, exchanges
aptly halted abuse and manipulation that could have occurred but for
strict regulations constraining specialists. 95
Under the new system, regulated by Regulation ATS and
Regulation NMS, high-frequency traders replaced the specialist as the
market's provider of liquidity and protector from market volatility. 96
Fundamentally, the new system refuses to administer the same
88.

J. Scott Colesanti, Not Dead Yet: How New York's Finnerty Decision Salvaged the Stock

Exchange Specialist, 23 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 1, 4 (2008) (explaining the impact of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 on the duties and limitations of specialists).
89. Id. (pointing out that "[s]pecialists enjoyed a uniquely profitable place in the market
arena").

90. Id. at 3.
91. Id. at 4-5.
92. Simon & Trkla, supra note 79, at 225. The information advantages discussed here relate
to the specialist's unique position to know the intentions of major market participants. Id. at 224-25.
A specialist, knowing all the outstanding bids and offers relating to a stock, was afforded an
opportunity to profit by trading her own ownership interests in light of market demand or supply of
a given stock. Id Exchanges placed heavy regulations on these specialists as a result of the potential
of abusive trading by the specialists themselves. Id.
93. Id. at 225.
94. Id. at 227; see also Colesanti, supra note 88, at 4 (describing the "sanctity of the agency
relationship" between specialists and their clients).
95. See Colesanti, supra note 88, at 2-10 (providing a historical account of the evolution of
specialists' duties).
96. Gary Stone, HFT & Specialist: What was the Cost of NYSE Liquidity in 2001 vs. 2008?,
BLOOMBERG TRADEBOOK (Nov. 19, 2013), http://www.bloombergtradebook.com/blogihftwhat-

was-the-price-for-liquidity-nyse-liquidity-in-2001 -vs-2008.
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obligations on high-frequency traders-who have assumed the role as
market-makers-by not holding high-frequency traders accountable as it
did with specialists. 97 To adequately understand the replacement of
specialists by high-frequency traders, and to assess what obligations
high-frequency traders should possess, it is essential to understand
the
98
market.
the
on
impact
its
and
ATS
Regulation
of
emergence
Each market-maker still maintains accountability for the trade
volume for her clients' stock. 99 Corporations hire DMMs to monitor,
analyze, and account for the price of the corporation's stock.100 Some of
the more prominent DMMs manage upwards of fifty different
corporations' stock.' 0 These DMMs have the obligation to buy and sell
the stock depending on market demands. 0 2 This obligation arises from
the desire to have liquidity in the market. 10 3 Likewise, DMMs
provide liquidity because there are always ready buyers and sellers for
the given stock.' °4
Besides providing liquidity by buying and selling from her personal
account, 10 5 the actual person on the floor of the NYSE monitors various
sources of information for her clients. 10 6 Public companies employ
97. See Mark D. Fitterman et. al., Challenges in Requiring High-Frequency
Traders
to
Register
as
Dealers,
MORGAN
LEWIS
(June
10,
2014),
http://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/FinServices LF ChallengesRequiringHighFreqTradersRegister
asDealers_ 10june14 (addressing the potential impact of requiring high-frequency traders to register
as broker-dealers).
98. See Dean, supra note 84, at 234.
99. Market Model Overview, N.Y. STOCK EXCHANGE, https://www.nyse.com/marketmodel/overview (last visited Sept. 2,2015).
100. Mridhula Raghavan & Avik Das, Goldman to Sell Designated Market-Maker Unit to
IMC, REUTERS (May 22, 2014, 6:43 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/22/usgoldmansachs-nyse-idUSBREA4LO1 W20140522.
101. See id. (discussing personnel hired by IMC and operating on more than one hundred
exchanges around the world).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
105. What
We Do, IMC
FIN. MARKETS
(Dec.
18,
2014, 3:30
PM),
http://www.imc.nl/financialmarkets/whatwedo. For example, the actual person may be employed by
XYZ Financial, which provides the capital to buy and sell throughout the day to maintain liquidity.
See Designated Market Makers, N.Y. STOCK EXCHANGE,
https://www.nyse.com/
publicdocs/nyse/listing/fact sheet dmm.pdf.
106. See Market Model Overview: DMM Case Studies, supra note 10. Market-makers monitor
all trading activity and news about the stocks they manage, including information disseminated
from news authorities, and even Twitter activity. See Matthew Philips, How Many HFT
Firms

Actually

Use

Twitter

to

Trade?,

BLOOMBERG

BUS.

(Apr.

24,

2013),

http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2013-04-24/how-many-hft-firms-actually-use-twitter-totrade. Tweets, even arbitrary or unqualified ones, can affect the price of stock. See id (discussing
how trading algorithms responded to tweets, even fake ones). By constantly monitoring all activity
and disseminated information, the market-maker reported back to the public companies she
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DMMs to maintain a steady watch over the trading activity throughout
the day, but companies do not simply desire that a person monitor their
stock. They demand that their DMMs ensure a constant trading volume
by supplementing supply and demand throughout the day. 107
Market-makers have found that a critical area of accountability
ceased to exist after the automation of the markets. 10 8 For example, prior
to the automation of trading, if an investor wanted to buy 10,000 shares
of XYZ stock, but accidentally ordered 100,000 shares (due to human
error), the specialist would speak to the actual people that sold the shares
to the investor and correct the mistake. 10 9 The sellers could simply agree
to rescind the purchase, resetting the status quo."I 0 Buyers and sellers did
this because they understood that mistakes occurred, and wanted to
maintain professional relationships with other members buying and
selling on the floor of the NYSE."' If the same situation were to occur
today, it would be impossible to reach out to the seller to correct the
buyer's typographical error because the buyers and sellers are computers
that execute trades. 1 2 The buyer, mistakenly ordering 100,000 shares,
now owns 100,000 shares without the ability to correct the order.
Importantly, the market-maker possesses authority to reverse clearly
erroneous trades, but this standard often makes it difficult to justify
correcting an errant trade. 113
C. A Speedy Introduction to High-FrequencyTrading
High-frequency trading is often defined by the algorithms it uses,
the physical location of its facilities, and the strategies it implements to

monitors to educate them on who was buying and selling, any large purchases or sales, and any
other relevant information that the company wanted to know in order to understand the fluctuations
in the market for their stock. Market Model Overview: DMM Case Studies, supra note 13.
107. See What We Do, supra note 105. Market-makers "maintain a fair and orderly market
[and] regularly commit capital to add liquidity to the market, and to bridge the gap between
supply/demand." Market Model Overview: DMM Case Studies, supra note 10.
108. See NYSE Market Model, NYSE (July 12, 2015, 7:00 AM), https://www.nyse.com/
markets/nyse/market-model.
109. See generally id. (describing how the NYSE utilizes circuit breakers and DMMs on the
trading floor to effectively and efficiently correct errors).
110. See id. (explaining the NYSE's "high touch" approach and referencing the marketmaker's-previously the "specialist"-ability to interject a human component into automated
trading in order to maintain market integrity).
111. See What We Believe In, MC FIN. MARKETS, http://www.imc.nl/financialmarkets/
whatwebelievein (last visited Sept. 2, 2015).
112. See DesignatedMarket Makers, supranote 105 (speaking to the anonymity of trades).
113. See Market Model Overview: DMM Case Studies, supra note 13 (providing examples of
erroneous trades).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2015

13

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 4 [2015], Art. 9

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:1231

gain profits. 1 4 No set definition truly exists, and it is important to
identify high-frequency trading by looking at the technology used by
15
firms.
First, advanced algorithms assess the market and buy and sell
any given stock depending on certain triggers. 116 The exact
algorithmic strategies are largely unknown, being classified as trade
secrets." 7 Second, fiber-optic networks exist to facilitate the fastest
speeds in the realm of communication." 8 Finally, high-frequency
traders use co-location of facilities by physically placing their
computers in close proximity to exchanges to gain an advantage over
other speedy traders." 9
This technology blended with trading strategies, such as
arbitrage, 20 has empowered high-frequency traders with the ability 1to
21
earn profits by executing trades on multiple exchanges and venues.
Regulation ATS provides the overall regulatory structure that empowers
high-frequency traders to reap profits by trading on information they see
24
122
Fiber-optics 123 and co-location
before other market participants.
114.

FUTURES INDUS. ASS'N, FIA SPECIAL REPORT: CFTC DISCUSSES HIGH-FREQUENCY

TRADING (2012), available at http://www.eurexchange.com/blob/187322/ be3049e213f16793b3
cc42001be5798d/data/FIA special report.pdf (citing the Technology Advisory Committee's
working definition of high-frequency trading).
115.

Id.

116. Id. Triggers vary among different algorithms as algorithms choose when to buy and sell a
stock based on different things-i.e., when a stock drops to a certain level below the median trading
price for a given day the algorithm will execute a buy order. See id.
117. High-Frequency Trading - A Discussion of Relevant Issues, XETRA 7 (May 8, 2013),
http://www.eurexchange.com/blob/exchangeen/455384/426058/2/data/presentation hft mediawor
k-shopchinycen.pdf (dividing algorithmic strategies into two main categories: liquidity
provision and arbitrage).
118. LEWIS, supra note 4, at 60-62 (describing the process by which fiber-optics provide for
faster trading speeds because the infrastructure of fiber-optic networks transmit information much
faster than other communication systems such as radio waves or phone lines).
119. Id. The buildings containing high-frequency trading systems are physically located next to
the buildings that house exchange computer systems. Id. at 62-64 (coining the term "co-location" as
a result of selling "proximity services" which is the practice of placing computers in close proximity
to exchanges to reduce latency time of trades).
120. Arbitrage is a trading strategy based on the ability to receive information faster than
others. See Stanislav Dolgopolov, The Maker-Taker Pricing Model and its Impact on the Securities
Market Structure: A Can of Worms for Securities Fraud?, 8 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 231, 250-57
(2014). High-frequency traders see the lowest sell and highest buy order among all the exchanges
and alternative trading systems, and can act on this information infinitely faster than the average
investor. See id. High-frequency traders make a profit by scooping up the difference between prices,
as well as through payment of rebates from alternative trading systems that pay money to marketmakers trading on their systems. See id.
121. Id. at 250.
122. See id. at 247 (discussing the exploitation of the rebate/fee structure in equity trading).
123. See LEWIS, supra note 4, at 60-62 (describing the process by which fiber-optics create
speed).
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125
integrated directly into the Regulation ATS regulatory system.
Regulation ATS is the skeleton, the technology is the muscle, and the
high-frequency traders are the heart, constantly pumping trades
throughout the entire system. 12 6 Powering the new body of the market
was the advanced algorithm-the
automated brain deciding where,
127
when, and what to trade.
For new alternative trading systems, the goal was to entice the
newly born market participants to execute trades on their systems, and
away from NYSE and NASDAQ. 128 The systems offered cash (at
fractions of a penny) to anyone executing trades on their systems. 29 The
Maker-Taker Pricing Model ("MTPM") 130 harnessed the power to
incentivize traders to execute on alternative trading systems. 131 By
paying market-makers-high-frequency traders-alternative trading
systems created a novel area of competition in the132securities industry,
threatening the dominance of NYSE and NASDAQ.
MTPM disturbs best execution by potentially incentivizing adverse
selection. 33 High-frequency traders may execute trades on venues that
13 4
offer the highest rebate, instead of trading according to best execution.

124. See id. at 62-64 (coining the term "co-location" as a result of selling proximity services
which is the practice of placing computers in close proximity to exchanges to reduce latency time of
trades).
125. See id. at 65-66 (stating the various institutional investors and proprietary investors who
purchased co-location services to enhance their trading speed).
126. See id. at 81-82 (examining the problems the SEC faced after the Flash Crash of 2010 and
how the regulatory environment was not ready to truly assess high-frequency trading).
127. See FUTURES INDus. Ass'N, supra note 106 (explaining the difficulty in defining HFT
because different algorithms implement different strategies).
128. Dolgopolov, supra note 120, at 235.
129. See id. at 234-35.
130. Id. Dolgopolov details the basics of MTPM:
In its standard form, MTPM is a matching mechanism that imposes a fee on liquiditytaking / "aggressive" orders, i.e., market orders and marketable limit orders, and
provides a rebate to liquidity-making / "passive" orders, i.e., nonmarketable limit orders,
while the trading venue in question retains a portion of this fee.
Id.
131. Id.
132. See Michaels, supra note 12 (reiterating the NYSE's position against rebate structure of
other platforms and the growing number of trades occurring on different exchanges). ECN
"launched a payment system" that created competition where it had not existed before. Dolgopolov,
supranote 112, at 235. MTPM, whether high-frequency traders use it to the detriment of the market
or not, is consistent with Congress' goal of creating a national market system where various venues
compete to execute trades. Id. at 238-39.
133. Dolgopolov, supra note 120, at 247-48.
134. Id. at 248. The threat is that a high-frequency trader trading on behalf of another investor
will not execute a trade based on the best price, but rather on the exchange that pays the best rebate.
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A regulatory incentive also exists to afford high-frequency traders
narrow discretion to execute trades that keep them operating in the
black-high-frequency traders increase liquidity and decrease market
volatility. 135 In other words, a best execution analysis not only assesses
whether trading occurred at the best price, but also whether the most
efficient trade occurred. 136 The MTPM is not inherently bad, but
Lewis portrays MTPM as a villain in Flash Boys to show that the model
can be abused. 137 Regulators must be able to effectively halt abuse, and
ensure that the use
of rebates does not negatively impact DMMs' duty of
38
1
execution.
best
Even with the looming threat of abuse, high-frequency trading
profits have sharply declined in recent years. 39 In 2009, high-frequency
trading earned approximately five billion dollars, as compared to a
meager one billion in 2012.140 The reduction in earnings mirrors
141
diminishing trade volume executed through high-frequency trading.
The waning dominance of high-frequency trading may be attributed to
the same regulatory landscape that enabled it to exist. 142 In fact, the
competition and efficiency that Regulation NMS and Regulation ATS
aspired to promote between the NYSE and the rest of the market has
spurred competition between high-frequency traders. 143 Just as highfrequency trading syphoned dominance from the NYSE, the firms
engaged in speed trading now compete against each other.' 44 Through
135. See Vergotis et al., supra note 22 (claiming that high-frequency trading provides a service
to the market by providing liquidity and reducing volatility).
136. FINRA R. 5310. The rule states relevant factors in determining best execution:
(A) the character of the market for the security (e.g., price, volatility, relative liquidity,
and pressure on available communications); (B) the size and type of transaction; (C) the
number of markets checked; (D) accessibility of the quotation; and (E) the terms and
conditions of the order ....
Id.
137. LEWIs, supra note 4, at 169 (maintaing that "[t]he rebates were the bait in the highfrequency traders' flash traps").
138. See infra Part III.A.
139. Matthew Philips, How the Robots Lost: High-Frequency Trading's Rise and Fall,
BLOOMBERG Bus. (June 6, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2013-06-06/how-therobots-lost-high-frequency-tradings-rise-and-fall.
140. Id.
141. Id. Trades executed by high-frequency trading firms constituted two-thirds of all stock
trades in 2011, dropping to half of all stock trades in 2013. Id. Likewise, high-frequency trading
accounted for 3.25 billion shares a day in 2009 to 1.6 billion shares a day in 2012. Id.
142. Larry Tabb, No, Michael Lewis, the US Equities Market is Not Rigged, TABB F. (Dec. 31,
2014), http://tabbforum.com/opinions/no-michael-lewis-the-us-equities-market-is-not-rigged.
143. Id.
144. See generally H.-Johannes Breckenfelder, Competition between High-Frequency Market
Makers, and Market Quality, NYU STERN (May 6, 2013), http://people.stem.nyu.edu/
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this competition, the investors are beginning to reap the rewards of highfrequency trading in45the form of faster, more efficient, and cheaper
executions of trades.
III.

WHY THE CURRENT PROTOCOL HANDICAPS INVESTORS BY

FAILING TO ADEQUATELY DISCLOSE MATERIAL INFORMATION

The mission of the SEC-and the reason Congress established the
agency-is to "protect investors, maintain fair, orderly and efficient
markets, and facilitate capital formation."' 146 The proper regulation of
high-frequency trading can provide liquidity and decrease volatility,
providing a fair, orderly, efficient, and safe market for investors. 147 Most
importantly, the current regulation fails to protect the investors from
losing out to corrupt trading strategies. 48 This Part presents the current
state of securities regulation regarding best execution and protocol for
reporting material information required
to assess whether broker-dealers
49
follow best execution practices. 1
A necessary aspect to any investigation of high-frequency trading
involves an assessment of whether these speedy traders maintain any
duties and obligations to the market in general. 5 ° Whether highfrequency trading negatively impacts the integrity of the market depends
on the reach and control that the regulations have on high-frequency
trading. 151 Since the new trading method involves a drastic shift in how
market participants execute trades among each other, one must ensure
that those who use high-frequency trading 52are not violating best
execution obligations owed to their customers.1

jhasbrou/StemMicroMtg/StemMicroMtg20l3/Papers/BreckenfelderHFT 2013.pdf (examining the
effect of high-frequency trading in terms of economic impact).
145. Id.
146. The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity,
and Facilitates Capital Formation, SEC. EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sc.gov/about/
whatwedo.shtml (last modified June 10, 2013).
147. See EUREX, supranote 11.
148. Anthony Zurcher, Is Wall Street Rigged?, BBC NEWS (Apr. 9, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-echochambers-26947384.
149. See infra Part III.A.
AN

150. RBC GLOBAL ASSET MANAGEMENT, BEST EXECUTION: DEFINING BEST EXECUTION IN
INCREASINGLY COMPLEX TRADING ENVIRONMENT 3 (Fall 2010),
available at

https://us.rbcgam.com/resources/docs/pdf/whitepapers/equity/o20trading%20paperbest%20executi
on.pdf (describing Transaction Cost Analysis ("TCA"), a commonly used tool to assess best
execution).
151. Id.
152. Id.
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Additionally, the Commission can modify the rules governing the
disclosure of trading statistics. Today, broker-dealers report under the
guidance of Rule 605' and Rule 606.154 These rules require brokerdealers to divulge what types of orders they execute and the percentage
of their business coming from each type of order. 55 However, these
Rules should be modified to provide material information that is
56
accessible to the market participants, as well as retail investors. 1
A. FINRA Rule 5310: Toothless Best Execution PrinciplesCannot
Take Bites Out of High-Frequency Trading
As a compliment to governmental regulation, FINRA dedicates
itself to providing regulatory measures that protect the efficiency and
effectiveness of the securities industry.' 57 FINRA drafts, implements,
and enforces rules "governing the activities of more than 4,055 securities
firms. 158 Importantly, FINRA established Rule 5310: Best Execution
and Interpositioning. 159 FINRA charges broker-dealers handling
customer orders to "use reasonable diligence to ascertain the best market
for [a] security."' 6 ° Rule 5310(a)(1) also obliges a broker-dealer to "buy
or sell in such market so that the resultant price ...is as favorable as
' 61
possible underprevailingmarket conditions."'
Notwithstanding the language of FINRA's Rule 5310, the
requirements remain murky and vague.162 The SEC has not promulgated
its own best execution rule, nor has it expressly defined best
execution. 63 The securities industry, through private entities like
FINRA, the NYSE, and NASDAQ, assumes the duty of establishing and

153. 17 C.F.R. § 242.605 (2014).
154. 17 C.F.R. § 242.606 (2014).
155. § 242.605; § 242.606.
156. See infra Part IV.B.
157. About FINRA, FINRA (Nov. 5, 2014, 12:35 PM), http://www.finra-.org/AboutFINRA.
FINRA is an "independent not-for-profit organization authorized by Congress to protect America's
investors by making sure the securities industry operates fairly and honestly." Id.
158. Id.
159. FINRAR.5310.
160. FINRAR. 5310(a)(1).
161. Id. (emphasis added).
162. Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O'Hara, The Law and Economics of Best Execution, 6 J.
FIN. INTERMEDIATION 188, 190 (1996).

163. Id.at 191. The SEC merely requires the disclosure of information to assess best execution
while FINRA promulgates the actual best execution rule.
FINRA MANUAL R. 5310.
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monitoring best execution. 1 64 Best execution assures "the 165
practicability
of brokers executing investors' orders in the best markets."
Coupled with the obligation to execute trades in the most favorable
way is the prohibition of interpositioning. 166 If a third party
"interjects" itself into the middle of a trade, resulting in the violation of
best execution, that third party unnecessarily interpositions itself
between market participants.1 67 Regulators view interpositioning
as an unnecessary impediment to the operation of a fair and
efficient market. 68 Moreover, the prohibition applies to proprietary
trading firms, 169 and
not only traders that execute trades in an agency
70
role for investors.

High-frequency trading links customers' buy and sell orders to earn
profit on the differences in quoted price (arbitrage) and to earn
rebates. 7 1 However, notwithstanding the existence of interpositioning or
front running, the arbitrage strategies utilized by high-frequency traders
are legal. 172 Any legal determination relies heavily, and almost
exclusively, on whether high-frequency trading satisfies best execution,
17 3
even with the addition of the high-frequency trader as a middle man.

164. See James S. Wrona, The Best of Both Worlds: A Fact-BasedAnalysis of the Legal
Obligations of Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealersand a Frameworkfor Enhanced Investor
Protection, 68 Bus. LAW. 1, 35 (2012) (explaining how the best execution practices established by
FINRA derive from common law agency principles and fiduciary obligations).
165. Macey & O'Hara, supra note 162, at 191.
166. FINRAR. 5310(a)(2).
167. Id. ("No member or person associated with a member shall inteiject a third party between
the member and the best market for the subject security in a manner inconsistent with [best
execution].").
168. See id.
169. Id. Propriety trading firms execute trades for themselves, as opposed to firms that execute
trades for and on behalf of a client. Definition of Proprietary Trading, FIN. TIMES,
http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=proprietary-trading (last visited Sept. 2, 2015).
170. FINRA R. 5310(e) ("The obligations ... exist not only where the member acts as agent
for the account of its customer but also where transactions are executed as principal.").
171. See LEWIS, supra note 4, at 65. Front running occurs when a proprietary firm executes a
trade and takes advantage of knowledge of customers' orders. Kate Kelly & Susanne Craig, NYSE
'Front-Running' Probe Involves Five of Seven Firms, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 18, 2003),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB 105061361377009700.
172. See Tricchinelli, supra note 4.
173. Id. Journalists, scholars, and industry leaders question whether the markets are "rigged" in
favor of high-frequency trading. Id. How regulators see the role of the high-frequency trader is
crucial; if high-frequency trader's position as middle man accommodates best execution then it
should not be seen as a violation of FINRA Rule 5310. See FINRA R. 5310(a)(2). However, the fact
that firms like Virtu Financial, Inc. can have five consecutive years of gains with only one day of
reported losses causes regulators to question whether the market is, in fact, rigged. See Tricchinelli,
supranote 1.
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The overarching question is whether high-frequency trading
interjects unnecessarily, thus interpositioning and violating FINRA's
best execution rule. 174 Two situations arise where the potential for
interpositioning exists: (1) a high-frequency trading platform sees a buy
and sell order faster than other investors and matches up the lower sell
order with the higher buy order so it can make a profit by recouping the
difference between the two prices; 175 and (2) a high-frequency trader
executes a trade for her client not regarding the best bid available, but
instead trading on whichever venue provides the highest rebate (also
known as "Payment for Order Flow"). 176 In the first situation, some
people believe that high-frequency trading burdens investors with an
unnecessary tax on investors. 177 However, groups utilizing advanced
technology for arbitrage have always existed in the market, and earned
the right to use technology to arbitrage because they invested in the
technology while other investors did not. 178 Importantly, this situation
does not mesh with the discussion of whether high-frequency trading
breaches best execution. 179 Additionally, the benefits of such
174. But see Sarah N. Lynch, UPDATE 2-New York High-Speed Trading Firm Settles SEC
Charges Over Manipulation, REUTERS (Oct. 16, 2014, 4:46 PM), http://www.reuters.com/
assets/print-?aid=USL2NOSB2AT20141016 (stating recent charges for market manipulation).
Another issue surrounding high-frequency trading is whether the strategies implemented by highfrequency trading firms manipulate market prices. Id. (describing settlement negotiations between
the SEC and Athena Capital Research after Athena engaged in trading strategies that
"overwhelm[ed] the available market liquidity ... and artificially impact[ed] prices" by "marking
the close"). "Marking the close" involves placing "a large number of aggressive trades ... in the
final two seconds of... the trading day" which can greatly affect the price of a stock. Id. This Note
does not assess this issue, but it should be noted that regulators and prosecutors have recently
charged various firms with violating the ban on market manipulation. See id.; William Alden, HighFrequency Trader Chargedwith ManipulatingCommodity Prices, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2014, 2:25
PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/02/high-frequency-trader-charged-with-manipulatingcommodity-prices (describing the criminal case against Panther Energy Trading for the
manipulation of futures contracts); see also Bemstein, supra note 15 (discussing Eric
Schneiderman's implementation of the "Martin Act" which gives prosecutors "more leeway than
other state or federal securities laws to argue that the defendants intended to defraud" as
Schneiderman charges dark pools with market manipulation).
175. See John Naughton, Michael Lewis has Shown How Tech Nerds Rigged
the Stock Markets. But who Will Guard the Geeks?, GUARDIAN (Apr. 5, 2014, 7:01 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/apr/06/michael-lewis-flash-boys-high-frequency-traders
(describing the "colossal profits" that high-frequency investors make).
176. See id.
177. Zurcher, supra note 148 (quoting Naughton, supra note 175, explaining that "[pirofits of
high-frequency traders really amount to an unconscionable tax on the ordinary investor").
178. See Zurcher, supra note 148 (quoting Felix Salmon, a financial blogger for Reuters,
saying that "Wall Street code has always favored a small group of rich and well-connected
institutions who can afford to pay enormous sums of money to maintain their edge in the market").
179. FINRA R. 531 0(a)(2). Arbitrage, here, does not deal with a high-frequency trading firm
interjecting itself between one of its customers and another customer. Id. This arbitrage merely
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a decrease in
computerized trading have been documented to include
80
market volatility and an increase in market liquidity.
Harm to investors by high-frequency trading develops not from
arbitrage, but from high-frequency trading associated with executing
trades for a customer. 18' By executing trades on the venue that provides
the most profitable rebate, an "inherent conflict of interest" emerges
because high-frequency traders can "pocket the [rebates] instead of
passing them on to clients." 182 The question becomes whether routing
trades to the venue providing the highest rebate, and not at the best
price, remains consistent with best execution practices, under FINRA
Rule 5310.183
However, best execution does not only depend on executing trades
at the best price. 184 Indeed, many institutional investors, executing
thousands of trades a day, may prefer that high-frequency traders trading
on their behalf trade according to other factors as opposed to trading at
the best price. 185 For example, institutional investors may be more
concerned with anonymity, liquidity, and speed, instead of the price at
remain small,
which they buy and sell. 186 Importantly, the rebates
187
amounting to "20 to 30 cents per 100 shares traded."'
Thus, institutional investors may prefer that the high-frequency
trading firms that execute trades on their behalf execute trades that keep

reflects the high-frequency trader's ability to see price discrepancies and does not fall under the
realm of best execution. See id.
180. EUREX, supra note 14, at 2; see also Zurcher, supra note 148 (quoting John Aziz, from
The Week, explaining that computerization is a "double-edged sword" because "[e]ven with highfrequency traders taking their cut, investors are benefiting from transaction costs that are lower
than" before the computerization period).
181. FINRA R. 5310(a)(2). When high-frequency trading occurs on behalf of a customer it
falls within the regulatory arms of Rule 5310 and must be executed according with "reasonable
diligence." Id. 5310(a)(1).
182. Scott Patterson, Eyes on High-Speed Traders as JEX Pushes for Exchange Status,
MONEYBEAT: WALL ST. J. (Sept. 3, 2014, 11:30 AM), http://blogs.wsj.comI/moneybeat/2014/09/03/
eyes-on-high-speed-traders-as-iex-pushes-for-exchange-status.
183. Id. (noting that critics say that some of the advantages that high-frequency traders benefit
from are unfair).
184. FINRAR. 5310(a)(1)(A)-(E).
185. Arthur Levitt, Chairman, Sec. Exch. Comm'n, Speech at the Securities Industry
Association: Best Execution: Promise of Integrity, Guardian of Competition (Nov. 4, 1999),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speechlspeecharchive/1999/spch315.htm (explaining that
several factors besides best price may be "overriding concerns" for institutional investors). Arthur
Levitt stresses that "the quality of execution must always be viewed from the customer's
perspective, not the firm's." Id.
186. Id.
187. Patterson, supranote 182.
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the firm making profit from the rebates. 88 If the high-frequency trading
firm operates in the black, then the institutional investor that pays them
to trade can ensure that the firm trading for them continues to exist in the
market.189 This payment for order flow (rebates) "is acceptable if-and I
underscore if-the quality of execution is not sacrificed."' 90
Moreover, payment for order flow contributes new competition
among market centers.' 9 ' Arthur Levitt stressed in a speech to the
Securities Industry Association:
With more market centers than ever before, the duty of best execution
must be woven more fully into the fabric of our markets. It must be at
the very core of our promise of integrity to investors-a promise that
brokers will act in their customers' best interest when they route and
execute orders. It must reinforce competition, rewarding those markets
92
that improve their execution quality, and punishing those that don't. 1
Although spoken in 1999, these words have reverberated in subsequent
regulation of the markets.'
SEC Chair Mary Jo White addressed growing concerns that
brokers failed to provide best execution for investors, and charged
FINRA and the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board with amending
the best execution rule to "provide practical guidance" for brokers in the
age of high-frequency trading. 194 White further warned, however, that
"we must be mindful to strike the right balance" between regulation and
market participants themselves in order to maintain efficient and
competitive markets. 195
B. Disclosureof OrderExecution and Routing Practices:
A Computer'sInhumane InformationalAdvantage
The notion that adequate disclosures protect investors has existed
since the beginning of securities regulation. 196 This Subpart deals with
188. See Levitt, supra note 185 (explaining the varying factors to best execution, especially
regarding institutional investors).
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.(showing the speech was given in 1999); Mary Jo White, Chair, Sec. Exch. Comm'n,
Speech at the Economic Club of New York: Intermediation in the Modem Securities Markets:
Putting Technology and Competition to Work for Investors (June 20, 2014), available at
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/DetailI/Speech/1370542122012#.VGfrUvnF-0s.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
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the adoption of SEC Rule 605 and Rule 606 (formerly Rules 1 Acl-5
and 1 Acl -6, respectively) requiring disclosure of order execution and
routing practices. 197 Under Rule 605, the SEC requires any market center
(exchanges or alternative trading systems) that trades NMS securities to
make monthly statistical reports available to the public. 98 For example,
Goldman Sachs discloses this information on its website for all trades it
executed.' 99 Rule 606 provides guidance on reporting securities
transactions that are routed through another entity (as in trades given by
Goldman to a high-frequency trader to execute). 0 0
1. Who Can Read This?: SEC Rule 605 and the Misfortune of
Information Geared Towards Computerization
By promulgating Rule 605, the SEC pursued better disclosure and
visibility of executed orders in securities markets. 20 1 The rule requires
market centers, including DMMs, to "make monthly disclosures of basic

information concerning the quality of executions. 20 2 This rule provides
investors (and the SEC) with the ability to collect and analyze data with

respect to how broker-dealers process and execute trades. 3 Importantly,
the rule arose "out of the Commission's extended inquiry into market
fragmentation," and sought to quell issues arising due to order flow
204
through various venues.

197. Disclosure of Order Execution and Routing Practices, Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 34-43590, 65 Fed. Reg. 75414 (Dec. 1, 2000) [hereinafter Release No. 34-43590].
198. Id. at 7.
199. SEC Rule 605 (Formerly Known as Rule llAcl-5): Disclosure of SEC-Required Order
Execution Information, GOLDMAN SACHS, http://www.goldmansachs.com/compliance/Rule605 (last
visited Sept. 2, 2015) [hereinafter Disclosureof SEC-requiredOrderExecution Information].
200. Release No. 34-43590, supra note 197, at 75425-26; see also SEC Rule
SACHS,
606
Report: Disclosure of Order Routing Information, GOLDMAN
(last visited Sept. 2, 2015) [hereinafter
http://www.goldmansachs.com/compliance/Rule606
Disclosureof OrderRouting Information].
201. Release No. 34-43590, supra note 197, at 75415 (asserting that the SEC's overriding
concern involved in disclosures is assuring that investors receive the best possible price).
202. Id. at 75414.
203. Id. at 75415.
204. Id. at 75414. One growing concern in the securities industry is "Payment for Order Flow."
Paymentfor Order Flow, SEC. EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/answers/payordf.htrn
(last update June 25, 2007). Payment for Order Flow acts as a way to induce brokers to execute
orders to a particular venue. Id. The issue is whether routing orders to a particular venue in order to
receive payment for the order flow is appropriate. Id. The SEC requires: (1) that brokers divulge
whether they receive payment for order flow; (2) that brokers provide a detailed description of such
payments; (3) that brokers disclose, on the trade confirmation itself, whether they received payment;
and (4) that brokers provide for customers with information regarding the payment, if the customer
requests such information. Release No. 34-43590, supranote 197, at 75427-28.
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Rule 605 expressly states that its required disclosures are not the
only material pieces of information that investors seek.20 5 While it
requires disclosures that promote "visibility and competition" within the
market, the Rule must be adaptable to changing investor concerns. 20 6 In
particular, Rule 605 seeks to disclose information that pertains to
"factors of execution price and speed. 20 7
Furthermore, the information that Rule 605 requires broker-dealers
to disclose is merely a "starting point" for the types of disclosures
that should be disseminated to investors.20 8 As a starting point, Rule
605 must be malleable enough to include information relevant to
high-frequency trading practices, and if they cannot keep up with
high-frequency trading, the rules must be amended to ensure fair and
efficient markets.20 9
When viewing the disclosure first hand, one notices the symbol for
a given stock followed by eleven numerical values. 210 For example,
disclosures pursuant to Rule 605 are written as follows:
IYGE1 1112111212498101012498124981010101010.006210.01001010.000010.0124
9810.01010.000010.0.21 Starting from the left, YGE is the symbol for
Yingli Green Energy, a Chinese solar company.2 12 The subsequent
numbers correspond to sections 242.605(a)(1)(i)(A)-(K) of Title 17 of
the Code of Federal Regulations ("Rule 605").2l3 Matching the numbers
to the regulation, one finds that "11" corresponds to the number of
covered orders, "21" is the cumulative number of shares of covered
orders, "12" is the cumulative number of shares of covered orders
cancelled prior to execution, and so on.214 These disclosures simply do
not promote visibility and competition between market centers, which is
a crucial purpose of the regulation.2 15

205. 17 C.F.R. §242.605 (preliminary note) (2014).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. Rule 605 states: "The statistical information required by this section alone does not
create a reliable basis to address whether any particular broker-dealer failed to obtain the most
favorable terms reasonably available under the circumstances for customer orders." Id.
210. Id. The values correspond to the eleven categories of disclosure stated in 17 C.F.R.
§§ 242.605(a)(l )(i)(A)-(K).
211.

See id.

212. YGE Company Summary, GOOGLE FINANCE (July 12,
https://www.google.com/finance?q=yge&ei=zrinVZHBLpamAHAhZzgCw.
213. See §§ 242.605(a)(l)(i)(A)-(K).
214.

2015,

7:00

AM),

Id.

215. See §242.605 (preliminary note).
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One must note that these disclosures are designed to be readily and
easily imputed into a computer system.21 6 However, the disclosure is
largely useless for the average retail investor. 1 7 Since the data is not
designed or regulated for individual use, the retail investor cannot pull
useful information out of the Rule 605 disclosure efficiently. 1 8 The
regulation's design provides for ease of use by computers, without
providing the same level of accessibility to retail investors.21 9
The Commission notes that Rule 605 disclosures provide only a
"starting point" to promote "visibility and competition" between market
centers, as well as between broker-dealers.22 ° Unfortunately, this starting
point clearly misses the mark by failing to properly educate retail
investors. The Commission states that the statistical information "alone
does not create a reliable basis" to address best execution concerns.2 2'
The entire purpose of the Rule, however, is to consolidate trade statistics
and present them to retail investors so they can make informed decisions
about their broker-dealers.222 Better informed investors make wiser
decisions regarding who should execute their trades. Wiser and more
well-informed decisions bolster competition and create a better market.
The current disclosure requirements fail to require broker-dealers to
divulge material information in a readily accessible way, especially with
regard to the retail investor.2 23 Moreover, the information disclosed must
be regulated in a way to promote transparency, protect market integrity
by monitoring best execution factors, and account for rebate
relationships between broker-dealers and trading systems.224
2. SEC Rule 606 and Disclosing Routing Information
SEC Rule 606 requires broker-dealers that route orders for
customers to disclose which venue customer orders were executed on.225
Investors, industry leaders, and regulators can analyze this information
to properly monitor whether broker-dealers are trading according to best
execution practices and not simply to earn the most profit from

216. § 242.605(a) (stating the requirements for electronic disclosures).
217. See id.
218. See id
219. See Disclosureof SEC-RequiredOrder ExecutionInformation, supra note 199.
220. § 242.605 (preliminary note).
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. See RBC GLOBAL ASSET MANAGEMENT, supra note 141, at 2 (stating that the tools used
to monitor best execution are "only as effective as the human capital a firm deploys behind it").
224. Id. at 2-3.
225. 17 C.F.R. § 242.606 (2014).
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rebates.226 Providing this information is essential to understanding
whether a broker-dealer acted according to best execution, but
must be changed to facilitate the changing markets.227 Regulators
need more meaningful disclosures, especially in the context of highfrequency trading and where trading actually occurs, in order to better
inform investors.22 8
Rule 606 requires that broker-dealers disclose how they route
orders by stating the following information in terms of the percentage of
total orders that were "non-directed., 229 The rule divides non-directed
orders into three categories: (1) market orders, as a percentage of total
non-directed orders; (2) limit orders, as a percentage of total nondirected orders; and (3) other orders, as a percentage of total nondirected orders. 230 The SEC has previously noted that disclosure of such
information can provide customers with sufficient knowledge of the
routing practices of their broker-dealer. 231 However, examination of
actual Rule 606 disclosures often shows the failure of Rule 606 to keep
pace with trading trends.2 32
If a broker-dealer executes order types other than market or limit
orders, then its Rule 606 disclosure proves completely inadequate,
failing to provide a snapshot of the broker-dealer's trading practice.233
Order types, such as the "hide-not-slide, 234 can be hidden by broker226.

RBC GLOBAL ASSET MANAGEMENT, supra note 150, at 2-3.

227. See § 242.606.
228. See RBC GLOBAL ASSET MANAGEMENT, supra note 141, at 3 ("[T]he U.S. equity market
has seen electronic trading evolve to the point where market fragmentation has made it more
challenging than ever to manage the best execution process.").
229. See § 242.606; Release No. 34-43590, supra note 197, at 75426. A "non-directed" order is
an order that the customer does not direct her broker-dealer to execute on a particular exchange or
ATS. Release No. 34-43590, supra note 197, at 75426. "Directed orders" are orders that the
customer directs the broker-dealer to execute within a particular venue. Id.
230. § 242.606(a)(1).
231. Release No. 34-43590, supra note 197, at 75425-26.
232. See § 242.606(b) (requiring electronic routing disclosures on demand by investors instead
of providing steady reporting of routing information).
233. § 242.606(a)(1) (including percentages of "market orders, limit orders, and other orders"
allows a large variety of orders to be grouped together and included in an overall percentage,
limiting the scope of information actually passed to the investor). Goldman Sachs, for example,
executed 0.4% of non-directed orders that were market orders, and 0.2% of non-directed orders that
were limit orders. Disclosure of Order Routing Information, supra note 200. Likewise, 99.4% of
Goldman's non-directed orders were "other." Id. This disclosure leaves a clear gap in information.
A customer is unlikely to have the necessary information to understand how Goldman trades and,
thus, whether Goldman is a suitable broker-dealer. See Release No. 34-43590, supra note 197, at
75427 (stating that the proposed Rule 606 included disclosure of routing through all venues, but that
the final rule only included the "most significant venues").
234. See Patterson & Strasburg, supra note 63 (providing an in-depth look at "Hide-Not-Slide"
orders). Basically, "hide-not-slide" orders are complex order types designed to avoid the prohibition
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dealers in the "other" category in Rule 606 disclosures and would defeat
one of Rule 606's purposes: to provide material information so
customers can make informed decisions on who they want executing
their trades. 23 5 When ninety-nine percent of orders are qualified as "other
order" types, there is simply no way for a customer to paint a complete
picture of her broker-dealer, failing to ensure the broker-dealer trades
according to the customers desires.236
Not all broker-dealers trade so centrally within the "other"
category.237 Looking at data from the Royal Bank of Canada ("RBC")
Equity Electronic Trading, some broker-dealers execute the majority of
their trades through more classic order types. 238 RBC, a secondary
protagonist in Lewis's Flash Boys, reported 71.05% of its non-directed
orders as limit orders, while other order types only totaled 20.4 1%.239
The important distinction made by analyzing Goldman and RBC's Rule
606 disclosures is not that one executes trades more efficiently or
according to best execution, but that a customer gains more knowledge
from RBC's disclosure than from Goldman's. 240 This is not necessarily
because Goldman is keeping information from its customers, but more
of a clear showing of the failure of Rule 606.241 The focus of Rule 606
disclosures should encompass, and be limited to, the who, what, when,
where, and why of the particular trade.242 By understanding the answers
to these questions, one can assess whether high-frequency traders act
according to best execution principles.
Furthermore, Rule 606 charges broker-dealers with divulging the
percentage of orders executed on major exchanges, including: NYSE,

on locked quotations. Id.
235. Id. at 24 ("[D]escription of a broker-dealer's order flow should facilitate customer
understanding of its routing practices.").
236. See § 242.606; Disclosure of OrderRouting Information, supra note 200 (reporting 99.4%
of non-directed orders as "other").
237. See Total RBC Equity Electronic Trading Orders, TRANSACTION AUDITING GROUP, INC.
(Dec. 4, 2014, 4:22 PM), https://private.tagaudit.com/do/display (shortened URL).
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Compare Total RBC Equity Trading Orders, supra note 237, with Disclosure of Order
Routing Information, supra note 200.
241. See Release No. 34-43590, supra note 197, at 75427-28. The SEC, with Rule 605 and
Rule 606, sought to disseminate the data associated with the type of order, separating the rules from
notions of best execution and speed. Id. The SEC focused on how orders are executed, where orders
are executed, how favorable the market was for the order, and the cost for trading in a specific
venue. Id.
242. See id. (including the requirement to disclose relationships between broker-dealers and the
venues through which they execute trades).
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NASDAQ, BATS Global Market, and others.243 In identifying the major
markets that the broker-dealers trade through, Rule 606 also requires that
broker-dealers discuss their relationships to such markets.24 4
Additionally, broker-dealers must provide "a description of any
arrangement for payment for order flow and any profit-sharing
relationship" with trading venues. 24 5 These requirements force brokerdealers to fully assess their order types, relationships with venues,
and payment-for-order-flow received, but does not address Rule
606's purpose-to adequately inform investors.24 6 Rule 606 must
be altered to ensure that its purpose is achieved, and investors can
readily access material information regarding their broker-dealer's order
routing practices. 7
Some Rule 606 reports lack meaningful commentary concerning a
firm's relationship with various venues on which it trades.248 Similarly,
other market-makers provide only brief explanations of the relationships
they maintain with the venues that they trade through. 249 These
disclosures do not speak to any problematic situations such as the use of
dark pools and internalizing trades.2 50 Internalization occurs when a
broker-dealer provides both ends of a trade for its customer.251
Internalization is not illegal, and in fact, provides liquidity in a similar
way as high-frequency trading and DMMs2 Conversely, if a firm is
interpositioning, they clearly violate the FINRA best execution rule.25 3
243. 17 C.F.R. § 242.606(a)(1)(ii) (2014).
244. § 242.606(a)(1)(iii).
245. Id. In Goldman's Rule 606 disclosure report, this requirement is met by the inclusion of a
final paragraph on the report, which states: "The Firm accepts payment for order flow .... Further
information about the source and nature of payment for order flow received by the Firm will be
provided upon your written request." Disclosure of Order Execution and Routing Information,
supranote 200.
246. See Release No. 34-43590, supra note 197, at 75427-28 (leaving broker-dealers "free, of
course, to communicate" more information to investors, but expressly refusing to require such
disclosure).
247. See § 242.606.
248. Disclosureof Order Execution and Routing Information, supra note 200. The disclosure
too simply states: "[Goldman] is a designated market maker on the NYSE. Accordingly, the Firm
may indirectly profit from the execution of client orders by the Firm on the exchange." Id.
249. SEC Required Report on Routing of Customer Ordersfor QuarterEnding Mar. 31, 2015,
UBS (Dec. 5, 2014, 2:45 PM), https://www.ubs.com/global/en/investment-bank/secreports.html.
250. But see Release No. 34-43590, supra note 197, at 75427 (stating that § 242.606(b)(1)(iii)
specifically covers material aspects of relationships between broker-dealers and venues in an
attempt to unearth internalization).
251. Id.
252. See Charles R. Korsmo, High-Frequency Trading: A RegulatoryStrategy, 48 U. RICH. L.
REv. 523, 535-36 (2014).
253. FINRAR. 5310(a)(2).
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FINRA's bar on interpositioning concerns a firm interjecting itself
between its customer and a third party.254 The best execution rule does
not bar extraneous high-frequency traders that interject themselves
between trades through arbitrage strategies.255 While historically this
type of arbitrage was legal, the ability of high-frequency traders to
interject into transactions must be assessed to ensure that trades are
executed at the best possible price.
By forcing institutional investors to divulge information regarding
internalization and the use of dark pools, regulators can increase
transparency simply and efficiently.25 6 Notably, trades executed on dark
pools become public after execution, but are not available to the public
when the trades are un-executed orders.257 This allows sellers wanting to
sell large blocks of stock to hide the fact that a large sell order has been
placed.258 If the large sell order was known, buyers would be able to
offer less than the market value for the stock. 259 However, regulating
away the ability to use dark pools to conceal large orders would
eliminate an effective way to control volatility in the market. 260 Dark
pools decrease volatility because the ability to sell large blocks of stock
at the actual market value ensures that stock value does not dramatically
increase or decrease.26 ' Controlling volatility is critical to market
integrity. 262 Rule 606 must be altered to account for these pieces
of information. 263

254. Id.
255. See id.
256. See SEC Required Report on Routing of Customer Ordersfor QuarterEnding Mar. 31,
2015, supra note 249, at 535 (stating that orders "may be preferenced to the UBS Securities Market
Maker" (emphasis added)); see also LEWIS, supra note 4, at 211 ("IEX had done something no Wall
Street dark pool had ever done: it had published its own rules.").
257. LEWIS, supranote 4, at 211.
258. Brendan Conway, Investors Flee Dark Pools as Market Volatility Erupts, MARKETBEAT:
WALL ST. J. (Sep. 2, 2011), http://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/2011/09/02/investors-flee-dark-poolsas-market-volatility-erupts (discussing anonymity when trading through dark pools).
259. See id.
260. But see id. (stating that markets have proven sturdy enough to withstand volatility, even
without the use of dark pools).
261. See SEC Required Report on Routing of Customer Ordersfor Quarter Ending Mar. 31,
2015, supranote 249.
262. See Investor Alerts and Bulletins, Securities and Exchange Commission, New
Measure to Address Market Volatility (May 21, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/
circuitbreakersbulletin.htm (describing the various measures used to address market volatility).
263. See Release No. 34-43590, supra note 197, at 75424 (enabling investigation by thorough
disclosure and assessing whether "prices were moving against [the market] for reasons such as news
or market volatility").
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UPDATING THE PROTOCOL TO ENSURE BEST EXECUTION AND
ADEQUATE DISCLOSURE

Trading strategies must be better regulated in order to provide for a
fair and efficient market. 264 To properly regulate such conduct (and other
dangerous trading strategies), the SEC must promulgate amendments to
Rules 605 and 606, including reporting of significant information. 265 To
properly regulate the market, the SEC should collect more data on the
trading activities and strategies to better understand high-frequency
trading's role in today's market, especially considering the fact that
participants are investing in even faster-and less known-technology
that will improve transaction speed.266 With the collection and
monitoring of trading statistics, one can assess whether high-frequency
trades trade according to best execution.26 7 Regulating the changing
market in this way affords the ability to impose limited duties and
obligations on all high-frequency traders.26 8
The proposed requirements discussed in this Part will not burden
market participants with implementing expensive or expansive
disclosure monitoring systems.269 Instead, these changes to regulations
will capitalize on the existing infrastructure used by high-frequency
trading.270 Accordingly, this Note proposes to slightly change the
information passing through the pre-existing framework of disclosures to
impose minimal burden while maximizing information available to
average investors. 27 By substantially increasing the quality of
information, investors will increase their ability to make educated
decisions regarding who they choose to execute their trades.

264. See Patterson & Strasburg, supranote 63.
265. See Staff Legal Bulletin, Division of Market Regulation, No. 13A, at 4 (Oct. 16, 2001),
available at https://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/mrslbl3a.htm
(identifying "most significant
execution venues" as opposed to identifying all trading venues).
266. Financial Traders Turn to Lasers for Faster Deals, BBC NEWS (May 2, 2013),
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-22380611 (listing some new technologies).
267. See Best Execution Monitoring, IREsS, https://www.iress.com.au/en/Financial Markets/
Trading/Best execution monitoring.html (last visited Sept. 2, 2015) (discussing iRess's role in
monitoring best execution and responding to investor inquiries regarding best execution in overseas
markets).
268. SeeFINRAR.5310.
269. See infra Part IV.A-B.
270. See infra Part 1V.A-B.
271. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 242.605-.606 (2014).
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A.

Making Market Middlemen: Imposing FINRA Rule 5310
Obligations on High-Frequency Traders

FINRA, as a private regulatory authority, has a unique opportunity
to promulgate amendments to Rule 5310 to establish a clear and explicit
definition of the duty of best execution.272 By adding a section
explaining the application of the rule on high-frequency traders, the
issue of whether the rule places duties on high-frequency traders would

disappear.27 3 Coupling this affirmative duty and reporting of such
trading activity will provide adequate disclosures for investors.

A centralized data system can help stem, or at least identify, the
entities that engage in interpositioning. 74 FINRA Rule 5310 states that
the character of the market, size and type of the transaction, number of
markets reviewed, accessibility of the quotation, and the terms of the
order are among the factors at play in best execution.275 FINRA
expressly states that the actual participants in trades should be accounted
for in best execution.2 76
Not only would the who and how information assist investors on
making appropriate

investment

decisions,

it would

also provide

regulators with the data necessary to identify entities that are violating
securities laws.277 Naturally, interpositioning violates best execution 27
and
8
would subject such entities to fines, censure, or expulsion by FINRA.
Moreover, certain practices may be violations of § 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule lOb-5. 2 79 A lOb-5 violation

includes the alleged violator's culpable mental state when committing a
272. About FINRA, supra note 157.
273. FINRA R. 5310(a)(2). FINRA Rule 5310 should be clarified to include all high-frequency
traders. See id.
274. See supranotes 166-78 and accompanying text.
275. FINRAR. 5310(a)(1)(A)-(E).
276. Id. For example, assume JKL stock trades at a volume of 500,000 shares a day. If one
knew that fifteen percent (15%) of those shares were traded between unaffiliated entities, forty
percent (40%) was traded between affiliated entities, twenty-five percent (25%) was traded between
a parent and subsidiary, and twenty percent (20%) was internalized by a specific broker-dealer, one
can see exactly how JKL is being traded. Knowing this information would help investors execute
informed trades.
277. See Enforcement, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/lndustry/Enforcement/index.htm (last
visited Sept. 2, 2015).
278. See id. (quantifying disciplinary actions in 2014).
279. 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (2014). Section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 are the anti-fraud provisions
of the Exchange Act of 1934. Eric C. Chaffe, Standing Under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5: The
Continued Validity of the Forced Seller Exception to the Purchaser-SellerRequirement (2008),
available at http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article = I000&context=eric chaffee. If a
broker-dealer was found to be interpositioning or violating best execution in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security, the broker-dealer could be civilly and criminally liable. Id.
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fraudulent act.280 Naturally, proving such a mental state would be
difficult since computers execute trades for high-frequency trading
firms, but some regulators and prosecutors are taking steps to halt any
possible manipulation.2 8'
FINRA Rule 5310(a)(2) provides that "no member or person
associated with a member shall interject a third party between the
member and the best market for the subject security. '2 82 This provision
defines interpositioning when a member of FINRA (such as a highfrequency trading firm) interjects a third party.283
Accordingly, this provision should be altered to include the

member-utilizing high-frequency trading-that interjects itself absent
any relationship to the buyer or seller. This Note proposes that FINRA
amend Rule 53 1O(a)(2) to read as follows:

(2) In any transaction for or with a customer of another brokerdealer, no member or person associated with a member shall
interject a third party between the member and the best

market for the subject security in a manner inconsistent with
paragraph (a)(1) of this Rule; and
(A) No member or person associatedwith a member shall
interject and execute trades for the sole purpose of
assessing market conditions for the subject security,
including but not limited to placing multiple, highspeed orders that execute in succession.28 4
This addition is designed to prohibit high-frequency traders
from placing thousands of small buy and sell orders (which highfrequency traders use to gain an informational advantage). 285 This
280. § 240.10b-5. This mental state is known as "scienter," which has been held to mean
embracing the intent to defraud. Ernst & Ernst v. Hockfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 (1976).
281. See Smythe, supra note 10 (discussing Attorney General Eric Schneiderman's agreement
with Business Wire, Marketwired, and Newswire). Schneiderman has actively sought to impede
potential manipulation stemming from unfair use of data distribution networks as well as the use of
dark pools. Id.These information networks have been criticized for providing information to highfrequency trading firms (for a premium) in advance of disseminating the information to the public.
Id. A central data system would take the place of private information disseminators. Id.By
replacing these private information centers, it would be much more difficult to exploit personal or
business relationships in order to gain an informational advantage. Id.
282. FINRAR. 5310(a)(2).
283. Id.
284. See FINRA R. 5310(a)(2) (additions to the text in italics).
285. See, e.g., LEWIS, supra note 4, at 219 (speaking about high-frequency traders using "100share lots as bait on the exchanges, to tease information out of the market while taking as little risk
as possible"); see also Michael Chlistalla, High-Frequency Trading: Better Than its Reputation?,
DEUTSCHE BANK REs. 8 (Mar. 8, 2011), http://www.dbresearch.com/PROD/DBRINTERNET_
DE-PROD/PROD0000000000270960.pdf (stating that high-frequency traders place large numbers
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type of high-speed order execution artificially drives stock prices up
and down.286
This Note also proposes a critical shift in best execution.287
Historically, interpositioning only occurs in a setting where the brokerdealer interpositions itself between its customer and a third party.288 This
means that, absent an agency relationship between the broker-dealer and
a customer, the broker-dealer can interject himself as many times as she
wishes between a buy and sell order because she is not breaching any
fiduciary duty to a customer.289
However, much like how the specialist owed a duty to the market
since it stood in the role of market-maker, so too should high-frequency
traders. 290 High-frequency traders have assumed the role of marketmaker by providing liquidity on both sides of trades. 291 As such, they
should assume the duties that were historically placed on specialists.
To establish this duty, this Note proposes that FINRA amend Rule
5310(3) to read as follows:
(e) The obligations described in paragraphs (a) through (d) above
exist where the member operates a registered highfrequency trading entity whether the member is acting as a
principal or an agent in the transaction. Such registered
high-frequency trading entities shall be labeled marketmakers, and as such, assume the obligations of marketmakers, including but not limited to practices which provide
market liquidity and decrease market volatility. Such
obligations are distinct from the reasonableness of
commission rates, markups or markdowns, which are
governed by Rule 2121 and its Supplementary Material.292
This regulatory change would make clear that high-frequency traders
have a duty to the market, and this duty exists according to the purpose
of securities regulation-to provide fair and efficient markets.

of small orders in order to assess whether there are large orders available in the market).
286. See Bhupathi, supra note 25 at 387-88 (explaining how high-frequency trading has
created a two-tiered market).
287. See infra notes 288-92 and accompanying text.
288. See FINRAR. 5310(2).
289. SeeFINRAR. 5310.
290. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
291. See supra Part II.
292. See FINRA R. 5310(e) (additions to the text in italics).
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B. Knowledge Transfusion: SuperchargingRule 605 and
Rule 606for Investors
It must be noted that Rule 605 and Rule 606 are merely starting
points for providing adequate disclosures to investors.293 The rules
explicitly acknowledge that "factors that may be important to investors"
may not be encompassed in the rules themselves. 294 The SEC and
industry leaders correctly note that creating a rigid set of factors for best
execution and best routing practices is, if not impossible, impractical.295
However, presenting data necessary to make informed investment
decisions is critical, and investors should be able to analyze hard data in
making their trade decisions.2 96
1. Bringing Trade Execution into the Light: Requiring Meaningful
and Material Information in Rule 605 Disclosures
Several changes must be made to better facilitate information
dissemination regarding Rule 605 disclosures.29 7 First, the process by
which Rule 605 reports are made available must be changed.298 Rule 605
requires that market centers make statistical information reasonably
available to investors.299 While some groups provide a quick glimpse at
this statistical information, °° the actual reports are simply not
reasonably available to investors. 30 ' As it stands, Rule 605 guides market
centers to provide statistics about the number of shares in orders, how
those shares are executed, and what the market for those shares was like
directly after the trade as well as on different venues, among other

293. 17 C.F.R. § 242.605 (2014).
294. Id.
295. Release No. 34-43590, supranote 197, at 75415.
296. See EnsuringHigh Frequency Trading Performancewith SevOne and Terilogy, SEVONE,
https://www.sevone.com/datasheet/ensuring-high-frequency-trading-performance-sevne-andterilogy (last visited Sept. 2, 2015) (providing high-frequency trading monitoring and analysis
services).
297. See id. (offering increased data collection and dissemination to its customers to bridge the
information gap for the customers).
298. See § 242.605.
299. Execution Quality: Consistently Delivering a High Standard, KNIGHT CAPITAL GROUP
(Dec. 4, 2014, 10:18 AM), https://www.kcg.com/access-performance/execution-quality.
300. Id.
301. 17 C.F.R. § 242.605 (2014). SEC Rule 605 requires that reports are made available for
download by investors. Id. Market centers and broker-dealers often make these reports available as
zip files on their website. See Execution Quality: Consistently Delivering a High Standard,supra
note 299; Disclosureof SEC-Required OrderExecution Information, supranote 199.
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things.3 °2 The Rule demands that the statistics be categorized by the
specific security, order type, and order size.30 3
To promote visibility and reasonable accessibility, this data should
be organized in a manner consistent with retail investors' ability to rely
on data and make educated investment decisions. 304 For example, by
presenting the data in a fashion that is consistent, readily accessible, and
usable, Knight Capital Group ("KCG") discloses simplified charts,
including: (1) execution speed; (2) price-improvement; and (3) at-orbetter statistics. 30 5 The SEC should require all market centers and
broker-dealers to present such information in this way.
In three, simplified charts, an investor can see where and how KCG
executes trades.30 6 By doing this, KCG adapts the information they
gathered for its Rule 605 disclosure report and presents it in a more
generalized, and thus, more accessible way. 3 07 While no list of factors of
best execution is exhaustive, the answers to the following three
questions provide the core factors of best execution: How fast are the
trades occurring? 30 8 What opportunity does the investor have for price
improvement? 30 9 And, is the investor getting at-or-better prices by
trading through KCG? 310 The answers to these three questions indeed
provide a direct and straightforward look at KCG's trade execution.3 1
Changing Rule 605 to incorporate this direct, three-tiered analysis of
statistics makes the information more readily consumable by retail or
institutional investors.3 12
KCG is no stranger to the world of high-frequency trading and the
issues associated with such trading.31 3 In fact, its computer algorithms
caused a $440 million loss in one day.314 While many believed that this
loss would be the end of the firm, KCG was able to recover and continue
to exist in the securities industry as a major player.315 The crucial part of
302. § 242.605(a)(1)(i)(A)-(K).
303. § 242.605(a)(1).
304. § 242.605.
305. See Execution Quality: Consistently Delivering a High Standard,supranote 299.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. See id.
309. See id.
310. See id.
311. Seeid.
312. See id.
313. LEWIS, supra note 4, at 201 ("In August 2012, the computers of thu big HFT firm Knight
Capital went berserk .... ); Jenny Strasburg & Jacob Bunge, Loss Swamps Trading Firm, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 3, 2012, at Al.
314. Strasburg & Bunge, supra note 313.
315. Id.
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KCG's loss was a failure to disclose how customers' orders were being
routed.3 16 KCG had routed most of its customers' orders into its own
dark pool. 317 Moreover, those orders routed to KCG's dark pool were
executed by a wholly-owned trading affiliate. 318 By routing trades this
way, KCG was able to interposition and profit from buying large blocks
of stock (in small quantities, many times) and selling them to buyers
(who KCG already knows want to buy).3 19 By modifying its practices,
KCG not only protected itself from similar losses in the future, it also
enhanced its disclosures to inform investors better than required by
SEC rules.32 °
The following is a proposed addition to Rule 605 disclosures that
will present three material and simple charts to better inform investors:
(a)(4) Every market center shall make available for each calendar
month, a report on the execution quality of trading in
accordance with reported trading statistics under paragraph
(a)(1)(i) of this section. Such report shall be provided
publicly and shall include, at a minimum, the following
information:
(i) Execution speed stated in hundredths of a second;
(ii) Percentage of trades reflecting price improvement; and
(iii) Percentage of trades at-or-better than National Best
Bid and Offer (NBBO).32 1
Following the example set by KCG, this information breaks down the
dense, statistical information already required by Rule 605 into
meaningful disclosures for retail investors.3 22 By providing execution
speed, price improvement information, and at-or-better information,
retail investors will be able to understand how their broker-dealers
operate, and, thus, be able to make an educated decision as to who
executes their trades.323

316. See Batista, supranote 17, at 102.
317. Id.
318. See Strasburg & Bunge, supra note 313.
319. See id
320. See Execution Quality: Consistently Delivering a High Standard, supra note 299 ("We
work together with our clients to understand their trade execution priorities .... Best execution is
our goal.").
321. FINRAR.605.
322. See Execution Quality: Consistently Delivering a High Standard, supra note 299
(describing the importance of transparency).
323. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 242.605 (2014), with Execution Quality: Consistently Deliveringa
High Standard,supra note 299 (breaking down statistic disclosures into simplified charts).
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2. You Know Where You've Been: Adequately Identifying and
Transmitting Routing Information
The standard established in Rule 606 falls short of protecting
investors because it does not provide enough transparency regarding
trade routing. 324 Likewise, by altering the procedures and structure of
reporting information, regulators can increase transparency.325
First, more meaningful disclosure of the relationships between
broker-dealers and the venues that they trade on must be made.
Requiring broker-dealers to report, in real-time, how and with whom
their trades are executed provides a steady data stream that can be easily
accessed and analyzed by regulators and investors.3 26 The data stream
shows both ends of every trade, regardless of how fast the trades are
executed.327 By monitoring, or at least archiving, the enormous amount
of trades that occur can be reviewed post-execution by regulators and
investors to ensure there was no interpositioning. 328 While reviewing this
data stream, one would be able to distinguish between interpositioning
and internalization.3 29 This process allows for quick, efficient, and costeffective execution of trades.33 °
The costs of providing different data, collecting that data, and
subsequently disseminating it into a real-time stream of information may
prove expensive.331 But, the very nature of high-frequency trading
provides a pre-existing structure for this information.33 2 While the
technology and equipment cost for high-frequency trading firms is great
up-front, proponents of high-frequency trading often cite the lowered
cost of trading for the average investor.33 3 The lowered cost to investors,
and profit gained by high-frequency traders, points to the industry
becoming more cost effective.334

324. Korsmo, supra note 252, at 596.
325. Id.
326. Datastream Professional, THOMSON REuTERS, http://thomsonreuters.com/datastreamprofessional (last visited Sept. 2, 2015) (describing an analysis application).
327. Korsmo, supra note 252, at 535.
328. See id at 535-36.
329. See id. at 536.
330. Id.
331. But see id. at 549-50 (discussing how high-frequency trading has dramatically reduced
liquidity costs).
332. See id.; Disclosure of SEC-Required Order Execution Information, supra note 199. The
structure for the dissemination of this information is already in place due to the existing
requirements of Rule 605 and Rule 606. 17 C.F.R. §§ 242.605-.606 (2014).
333. Nathan D. Brown, The Rise of High Frequency Trading: The Role Algorithms, and the
Lack of Regulations, Play in Today's Stock Market, 11 APPALACHIAN J.L. 209, 219 (2012).
334. See 17 C.F.R. § 202.606 (2014).
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Importantly, the cost-effective structure that is already in place
must be able to provide real-time execution data. 335 The algorithms are
used precisely to act on instantaneous information, place orders, and
execute trades thousands of times in a second.336 Simply parsing out the
end result, the actual trade execution, and sending this information to the
and would provide efficient and accurate data
data stream is reasonable,
337
for use by investors.
Thus, Rule 606 should be amended to require disclosure of this
information in a reasonable and efficient way. This can be accomplished
by utilizing the existing technological structure of the securities market
and sending basic information to a centralized data-stream, enabling
retail and institutional investors to better monitor daily trading activity.
The following amendment would replace paragraph (c), moving the
original paragraph (c) and renaming it "paragraph (d)":
(c) Continuous report on order routing.
(1) Every broker or dealer shall make publicly available, by
reporting trade routing information to a centralized datastream, trade execution and routing information. Each
report shall include:
(i) the identity of the buyer;
(ii) the identity of the seller;
(iii) the time of execution in milliseconds;
(iv) the price at which the trade executed; and
(v) the venue through which the trade executed.338
The information sought by this addition to Rule 606 is
information that is readily available to any entity that executes trades in
the current market-this is the information they gather and utilize in
algorithms to execute trades. 339 Thus, it should not be overly
burdensome for these entities to transmit such post-trade information to
a centralized data-stream.

335. Brown, supranote 333, at 217-18.
336. Felix Salmon & Jon Stokes, Algorithms Take Control of Wall Street, WIRED MAGAZINE
(Dec. 27, 2010), http://www.wired.co/2010/12/ff ai flashtrading/("High ftequency
traders ... buy and sell thousands of shares every second.").
337. See id at 213-14. Companies are already performing this function, but instead of having
multiple sources of trade information, the information can be gathered and disseminated through a
single data stream to ensure uniformity of prices. See id.
338. SeeFINRAR.5310.
339. See Andrew J. Keller, Robocops: Regulating High Frequency Trading After the Flash
Crash of 2010, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1457, 1464 (2012) (explaining how algorithms constantly adapt to
keep an informational market advantage).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol43/iss4/9

38

Schara: Knowledge is Salvation: Informing Investors By Regulating Disclos

2015]

KNOWLEDGE IS SAL VA TION

V.

CONCLUSION

The strategies implemented by high-frequency trading have
3 40
dramatically changed the landscape of the equity trading industry.
With this swinging change, the regulatory framework in place fails to
adequately account for new trading strategies, as well as the new players
in the securities industry.3 41 Since high-frequency trading assumes
essential functions, like decreasing volatility and increasing liquidity, it
is essential that new regulation does not over-regulate high-frequency
trading to the point where it cannot provide these functions.342 However,
protecting market integrity means that there must be a give and take
between the freedom with which high-frequency
traders conduct their
343
business and ensuring market integrity.
This Note argues that regulating high-frequency traders and
alternative trading systems to include the same positive and negative
obligations of specialists, to the extent that they provide best execution
and material disclosures, will both ensure market integrity and carve out
a place for high-frequency trading in today's markets. 3 " Importantly,
regulation currently exists pertaining to these issues, and amending the
regulatory scheme properly will not affect the benefits derived from
high-frequency trading (liquidity and lessening of volatility).3 45 While
the specialist may be on the verge of extinction, the high-frequency
trader must assume the specialist's duties and obligations.346
Appropriating the same requirements on high-frequency traders as we
did on specialists will protect the entire industry, and is consistent with
the Congressional intent of Regulation ATS and Regulation NMS.347
Furthermore, directing high-frequency traders to disclose material
information regarding their trading practices affords investors and
regulators the opportunity to investigate and analyze different trading
strategies. 348 By analyzing this information, one can assess whether a
particular firm or trading strategy implemented by a firm negatively

340.

See generally LEWIS, supranote 4 (arguing this point).

341. Seesupra Part HI.
342. See supraPart II.C.
343. See LEWIS, supra note 4, at 228-29 (questioning whether the useful function of highfrequency trading-providing liquidity-is necessary for market integrity).
344. See supraPart IV.A.
345. See supraPart III.
346. See supraPart I.B.
347. See supraPart H.B.
348. LEWIS, supra note 4, at 186 ("If you didn't even know the order of trades in the stock
market, you could hardly determine if you had traded at a fair price.").
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impacts best execution principles. 349 Likewise, best execution principles
must be broadened to include high-frequency traders that execute trades
on behalf of their own firms-as opposed to executing trades for a
customer.350 Doing so will place the same duties and obligations on
high-frequency traders that operate as market-makers, regardless of their
affiliation with parties they trade with.3 5'
As we come to more fully understand the world of high-frequency
trading, one must not jump to the conclusion that high-frequency trading
is a bane on market integrity. 352 New, developing trading strategies have
positive and negative impacts on the market, and current regulation can
be amended to both protect the new industry of high-frequency trading
as well as provide an avenue for analyzing these new trading
strategies. 3 Only with an increase in transparency, and an explicit
obligation to market integrity, will high-frequency trading be able to
cement its place in the securities industry while simultaneously
providing best execution.
Jeremy Schara*

349. Id. at 187.
350. See supra Part IV.A.
351. LEWIS, supranote 4, at 187 (explaining that imposing affirmative duties on broker-dealers
will keep them "scared" and force them to constantly check their own work to avoid violating
securities law).
352. See id. at 200-01 (discussing recent flash crashes and market volatility attributable to
high-frequency trading strategies).
353. See supra Part H.C.
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